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Harm Warrant the Imposition of Joint and
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INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), an aggressive
attempt to deal with the growing number of hazardous waste sites
throughout the United States.2 The Act imposes potentially harsh liability
on anyone contributing to a site "from which there is a release or
threatened release" of a hazardous substance.3 The mere presence of an
' The Comprehensive Eavironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1988)), amended by
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988)).
' SENATE COMM. ON ENvIRoNmENr AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., I A
LEGISLATIVE HisroRY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND
LIABISITY Acr OF 1980, 3 (Corm. Print. 1983); see also United, States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572
F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ("CERCLA was enacted both to provide rapid responses to the
nationwide threats posed by the 30-50,000 improperly managed hazardous waste sites in this country
.... "(citing 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20 (1980)); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546
F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) (stating that CERCLA provides the federal government with
the "tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to problems of national magnitude resulting
from hazardous waste disposal," and evinces congressional intent "that those responsible for problems
caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the
harmful conditions they created").
Section 107(a) of CERCLA provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses
set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party
or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party
or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
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individual's waste at a site is sufficient to expose that party to liability
under CERCLA irrespective of whether that individual's waste actually
leaked or escaped into the environment. In other words, liability under
CERCLA is strict for anyone whose waste is found at a site.4
Additionally, it has become a well-settled principle under CERCLA
that where the harm at a particular site is indivisible, the liability among
responsible parties5 is joint and several.6 However, it has been debated
whether the harm that must be indivisible in order to impose joint and
several liability should be limited to the actual harm present at the site
and the resulting cleanup costs incurred by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") or should include the potential or threatened harm posed
by the site as well. Because the Act includes the phrase "a release or a
threatened release"7 in imposing liability, an answer is not readily
apparent within the confines of the statutory language alone. While
clearly a party's contribution to a threatened release is enough to establish
liability under the Act, it does not necessarily follow that where the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removable or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried
out under section 9604(i) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9607; see also Anne D. Weber, Note, Misery Loves Company: Spreading the Costs of
CERCLA Cleanup, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1469, 1475 (1989) ("Any person linked by even a tenuous
thread to a site where hazardous wastes have been released should assess its liability promptly.").
'See 126 CONG. Rc. S30,932 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); 126 CONG. REc. H31,965
(1980) *(remarks of Rep. Florio); see also United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 and n.l1
(4th Cir. 1988) ("We agree with the overwhelming body of precedent that has interpreted section
107(a) as establishing a strict liability scheme."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States
v. Hardage, 761 F. Supp. 1501, 1509 (W.D. Okla. 1990) ("Liability under CERCLAis strict, without
regard to the liable party's fault or state of mind.").
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1312-13 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v.
Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810; see also United
States v. R-W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that while CERCLA does
not mandate the imposition of joint and several liability, it permits it in cases of indivisible harm),
cer. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-72 (noting that CERCLA has been
interpreted to impose joint and several liability); Kelly v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439,
1448 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that where two or more defendants are responsible for an
indivisible harm, each is subject to liability for the whole harm); see generally infra notes 63-69 and
accompanying text.
' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
DIvIsIBILITY OF HARM UNDER CERCLA
threatened harm is indivisible the imposition of joint and several liability is
proper on that basis alone. It remains to be established whether the EPA can
impose joint and several liability among multiple defendants on a theory that
the potential harm at the site was indivisible, or that the harm avoided by the
EPA'S response action would have been indivisible had it occurred.
The EPA argued that an indivisible threatened, potential or averted harm
is sufficient to impose joint and several liability for cleanup costs in 0Neil
v. Picillo! This assertion prompted the 07Veil court to focus on the issue of
whether divisibility should be determined based on an actual versus a
potential harm.9 While the court did not find it necessary to conclusively
decide the validity of the EPA's argument in the case at bar,"° it pointed to
the legislative history of CERCLA and judicial decisions under the Act in
mounting a rather harsh criticism of the EPA's reasoning."
However, the issue was not laid to rest by the 0 Neil court and, therefore,
the EPA may reassert its argument in the future in an effort to access a wider
range of deep pockets. The EPA may attempt to refute arguments of divisible
and apportionable harm set forth by defendants by contending that the
presence of an indivisible potential or averted harm requires the imposition
of such liability.
This Note examines whether an assertion by the EPA that the presence
of an indivisible potential or averted harm should give rise to joint and
several liability would be sustainable under CERCLA and existing case law.
Part I of this Note discusses in detail the context in which this issue arose in
ONeil v. Picillo and the First Circuit's treatment of the theory suggested by
the EPA' 3 Part 11 examines the legislative history of CERCLA and existing
common law tort principles that lend support to the court's criticism of the
EPA theory. 4 Part I[ evaluates the relevant case law under CERCLA,
which illustrates that the appropriate inquiry for determining the divisibility
883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
Id. at 180-81.
,0 Id. at 181 ("[We choose not to resolve the issue in this case. Had appellants met their burden
of showing that the costs actually incurred by the state were capable of apportionment, we would
have had no choice but to address the EPA's theory. But because we do not believe appellants have
done so, we can, and do, choose to leave the question for another day.").
" Id. at 178-81. The court stated that it was "troubled by the practical implications of the
Agency's argument" because such arguments were not supported by common law principles, and
there was no indication Congress intended to change the common law in this situation. Id. at 181.
2 The defendant carries the burden of demonstrating that the injury is divisible or otherwise
subject to apportionment. See REsrATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965); e.g., O'Neil, 682
F. Supp. 706, 724 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 176 (Ist Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071
(1990); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
"See infra notes 19-41 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 42-74 and accompanying text.
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of harm for joint and several liability purposes is the actual, rather than
potential harm, 5 and offers an illustrative example of the potential
effects of accepting the EPA's argument. 6 Part IV discusses how the
logic used to reject the EPA's theory concerning the imposition of joint
and several liability for actual removal costs should affect the allocation
of pre-cleanup and fixed administrative costs among multiple defendants
present at a waste site.17 Finally, this Note concludes that the harsh
criticism leveled against the EPA'stheory by the O'Neilcourt was clearly
justified and that any future attempt by the EPA to assert joint and
several liability on the basis of an indivisible potential or averted harm
should be thwarted as contrary to both the congressional intent that drove
the enactment of CERCLA and the established case law under the Act.'8
I. 0WEIL v. PIcLLo
The case of 0 Neil v. Picillo"9 arose from Warren Picillo's
disastrous decision to allow a portion of his Rhode Island pig farm to
be used as a disposal site for drummed and bulk waste. Thousands of
barrels of hazardous waste were dumped on the farm during the year
1977, culminating in a huge fire that ravaged the site late in the
year.2" In 1979, the EPA and the State of Rhode Island undertook the
cleanup of the area, finding "massive trenches and pits Tilled with
free-flowing, multi-colored, pungent liquid wastes' and thousands of
'dented and corroded drums containing a veritable potpourri of toxic
fluids."' 2' After undertaking the cleanup project, the State of Rhode
Island initiated a lawsuit in an attempt to recover the cleanup costs
incurred between 1979 and 1982. At the conclusion of a month-long
bench trial, the district court found three of the five companies to be
jointly and severally liable under CERCLA for all of the past cleanup
costs not covered by settlement agreements.' The other two defen-
dants escaped liability entirely.' Two of the three defendants found
,See infra notes 75-111 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 122-35 and accompanying text.
"See infira notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
"Id. at 177.
Id. (quoting O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 709, 725 (D.RI. 1988)).
"Id. at 178. "The State's complaint originally named thirty-five defendants, all but five of whom
eventually entered into settlements totalling $5.8 million, the money to be shared by the state and
EPA." Id.
"Two of the five defendants were found not liable by the district court because the State failed
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jointly and severally liable appealed to the First Circuit, claiming that the
harm at the Picillo site was divisible and, therefore, liability should be
apportioned among the defendants and not imposed jointly and several-
ly.
24
The defendants began by stressing that the state's cleanup costs
involved only surface cleanup. They then argued that it was possible
to determine the number of barrels of waste each of them had contributed
to the site and, in turn, to determine what proportion of the state's
removal expenses was attributable to each of them simply by estimating
the cost of excavating a single barrel.' The EPA asserted that the
defendants' recommended approach of apportionment should be reject-
ed27 because "even if it were possible to determine what proportion of
the state's removal costs are attributable to appellants, joint and several
liability still would have been proper because the 'harm to be apportioned
is not the cost but the environmental contamination that prompts the
response action."'28
The Agency thus "adhere[d] to the position that it is irrelevant
whether.or not the costs of removal can be apportioned."29 As explained
by the court, "[t]he reason the Agency takes this position is not, then,
because the environmental harm that actually occurred was indivisible,
but because the additional environmental harm that the government
averted would have been indivisible had it occurred."3 Thus, the
Agency set forth the proposition that an indivisible potential harm or risk
of harm should be sufficient to establish joint and several liability, even
where defendants have met their burden of showing a divisible actual
harm and a reasonable basis upon which to apportion that divisible harm.
The O'Neil court stated at the outset: "This argument gives us pause
because it appears to contravene the basic tort law principle that one pays
only for the harm that was, and not for the harm that might have
been."
3'
to prove that the waste attributed to those companies was "hazardous," as the term is defined under
CERCLA. Id.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 180.
U Id.
"The EPA first claimed "that it was not possible to determine how many barrels were traceable
to the appellants, nor was it possible to determine how much of the contaminated soil removed by
the state was attributable to each appellant, and therefore, that it is impossible to apportion the state's
removal costs." Id.
nId.
29Id.
"Id.
" Id. at 180-81. The court also set forth an example to illustrate its point:
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The court noted that if it were to accept the EPA's "averted harm"
argument, there would be only three situations in which apportionment
would be appropriate:
(1) all of the barrels were empty and no further environmental harm was
possible;
(2) the individual barrels were sufficiently far apart that even if further
spillage occurred, there would be no commingling of wastes and thus
no difficulty determining whose waste caused what damage; or
(3) every barrel contained precisely the same type of waste so that even
if there was further spillage and commingling, the environmental harm
could be apportioned according to the volumetric contribution of each
defendant?2
Under these three highly unlikely scenarios, even the potential or averted
harm would be divisible and thus capable of apportionment. However,
because the likelihood of any one of these three conditions ever actually
being present is so slim, joint and several liability would be imposed in
virtually every case.33
This fact drew substantial criticism from the court. First, the court
was "troubled by the practical implications of the Agency's argument"'
and criticized the EPA's theory because it would run afoul of the intent
of Congress: "[W]e believe Congress did not intend for joint and several
liability to be imposed without exception,"'35 which would be the
practical result of accepting the EPA's contention. Second, the court was
equally troubled by the fact that the EPA's theory finds no support in
common law tort principles, which were to be a guide in developing a
Assume that it costs the government $1 million to remove all of the barrels from a site,
but of this million, only $300,000 were spent removing the defendant's barrels. Also
assume that bad the barrels not been removed, the additional damage to the environment
would have been S5 million and that this five million would not have been divisible. The
government certainly would not take the position that it could recover $5 million in such
a situation. Instead, it would ask only for the $1 million that it actually spent. Yet when
it comes to apportioning that million, the Agency argues that we should look to whether
the $5 million of averted harm would be divisible.
Id.; see also United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 843 (M.D. Pa. 1989) ("Under common
law rules, when two or more persons act independently to cause a single harm for which there is a
reasonable basis of apportionment according to the contribution of each, each is held liable only for
the portion of the harm he causes.") (citing Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443
U.S. 256, 260-61 n.8 (1979)).
1 O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 181.
33Id.
"Id.
3 Id.
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uniform approach toward the imposition of joint and several liability
under CERCLA.' The court concluded:
We had thought that on the issue of joint and several liability we were
to take our lead from evolving principles of common law. It would
seem incumbent upon the Agency, then, to demonstrate that on this
particular question of joint and several liability, Congress intended for
us to abandon the common law.37
Although the First Circuit in 0 Weil did not render a dispositive
decision as to the validity and appropriateness of the EPA's argu-
ment,38 a close analysis of the legislative history,39 common law tort
principles," and existing case law under CERCLA4' illustrates that
the court's criticism of the EPA's argument was clearly warranted, and
that any future attempt by the EPA to assert a similar argument
should be soundly defeated.
11. SUPPORT FOR THE OWTEIL COURT'S CRITICISM
A. Legislative History
An examination of the legislative history of CERCLA and the
1986 amendments to the Act42 indicates that the inquiry for deter-
mining the divisibility of harm and the appropriateness of imposing
joint and several liability must focus on the actual harm that has
occurred, rather than the potential or averted harm. An acceptance of
the argument set forth by the EPA in the 0 Weil decision would result
in the imposition of joint and several liability in virtually all
CERCLA cases,43 a result clearly in contravention of congressional
intent and goals under the Act.'
3' Id. ('[lit seems to find no support in common law tort principles, which were to be one of our
benchmarks in developing a uniform approach to govern the imposition of joint and several
liability."); see also infia notes 41-62 and accompanying text.
O 0'Neil, 883 F.2d at 181.
3' See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
3' See infra notes 42-64 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
4, See infra notes 75-111 and accompanying text.
" Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988)).
"See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
"One of Congress' main concerns was the fair imposition of liability. See infra text
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In its final form, CERCLA was a compromise evolving primarily
from two bills, H.R. 7020V and S. 1480,46 both of which explicitly
provided for the imposition of strict, joint and several liability.47
Noticeably absent from the Act's enacted form, however, is any language
imposing joint and several liability. This deletion of any reference to joint
and several liability has been interpreted as an effort to avoid the
mandatory imposition of such liability under the Act."
The floor debates constitute the only legislative history addressing the
compromise bill as a whole,49 and generally indicate that Congress
wished to allow issues of liability to be decided under traditional and
evolving common law principles of tort law on a case-by-case basis, and
thus did not impose a mandatory liability standard.
For example, Senator Randolph, a sponsor of the Senate bill,
explained the significance of the deletion of the reference to joint and
several liability as follows:
[W]e have deleted any reference to joint and several liability, relying on
common law principles to determine when parties should be severally
liable.
... The changes were made in recognition of the difficulty in
prescribing in statutory terms liability standards which will be applicable
in individual cases ....
It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any,
shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law.
An example is joint and several liability. Any reference to these terms
has been deleted, and the liability of joint tort feasors will be deter-
mined under common or previous statutory law."
Representative Florio, a sponsor of the House version, agreed:
accompanying notes 52-60.
H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
"S. 1480, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
41 Id. at § 4(f); H.R. 7020, supra note 45, at § 307(a).
" See infra notes 75-109 and accompanying text.
41 See Barbara J. Gulino, A Right of Contribution Under CERCLA: The Case for Federal
Common Law, 71 CORNUL L. REv. 668, 672 (1986).
126 CONG. REc. 530,932 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph). Senator Randolph's reference
to "previous statutory law" has been interpreted to refer to § 311 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, which in turn has been interpreted as imposing strict liability and as allowing the
imposition ofjoint and several liability in situations involving multiple defendants. See Gulino, supra
note 49, at 673 n.23.
[Vol. 81
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Issues of joint and several liability not resolved by this shall be
governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law .... To
insure the development of a uniform rule of law, and to discourage
businesses dealing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in
States with more lenient laws, the bill will encourage the further
development of a Federal common law in this area. 1
Thus, the omission of language addressing joint and several liability in
the Act represents a conscious decision by Congress to encourage a
flexible approach to imposing liability by relying on an ever-developing
body of federal common law rather than a strict mandatory imposition to
be enforced in every case.
Courts have viewed the deletion of the language as evidence of
Congress' concern for achieving fairness.52 The Senate expressed this
sensitivity to fairness by rejecting a mandatory legislative standard and
opting instead to allow courts to impose joint and several liability on a
case-by-case basis. 3 The House evidenced its concern by passing a bill
that contained a very moderate approach to joint and several liability.'
As part of its bill, the House passed the Gore Amendment, 55 a provision
which softened the modem common law approach to joint and several
liability when applied to a defendant who contributed a relatively small
percentage to the waste site.' This proposal addressed the concern of
members of the House that in many cases a small contributor would not
be able to prove his contribution and would face joint and several liability
as a result.5 Under the Gore Amendment, a court would have retained
the power to impose joint and several liability whenever a defendant
could not prove his contribution to an injury, but could also apportion
damages in such a situation according to a number of equitable factors. 8
51126 CONG. REC. H31,965 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Florio).
See, eg., United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. I11. 1984)
('[B]oth Houses of Congress were concerned about the issue of fairness .. .
' See id.; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1256 for a discussion of the concern for fairness in
Congress.
126 CONG. REc. 26,783-85 (1980).
See A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1256 (discussing the Gore Amendment).
See id. (evaluating the legislative history of the Act).
5' See id. Among the factors a court could consider were:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge release
or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished;
(ii) the amount of the hazardous waste involved;
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation, treatment,
storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
1992-93]
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Although the Gore Amendment was not ultimately incorporated into
the Act, the concern of Congress to be fair is still evident in the
legislative history. In fact, a number of representatives believed the final
compromise bill implicitly incorporated the essence of the House's
moderate approach to liability.59 Additionally, committee reports indicate
that the general congressional intent driving the passage of CERCLA was
to place liability for toxic waste as nearly as possible on those responsible
for creating the hazard."
The contention that joint and several liability was not intended to be
mandatory under CERCLA is also supported by the legislative history of
its subsequent amendments, known as the Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act ("SARA").6' The amendments made no change in
the standard of liability under CERCLA.62 The congressional committee
report on SARA noted that "explicit mention ofjoint and several liability
was deleted from CERCLA in 1980 to allow courts to establish liability
through a case-by-case application of 'traditional and evolving principles
of common law' and pre-existing statutory law."63 In light of this
recognition, the 1986 amendments endorsed a flexible approach to
determining the scope of liability rather than mandating the imposition of
joint and several liability.'
While the statutory language of CERCLA itself is silent on the issue
of joint and several liability, the legislative history and Congress' refusal
to enact mandatory joint and several liability while amending the Act in
1986 demonstrate that acceptance of the EPA's argument set forth in
O'Neil would be contrary to the intent of Congress. The virtually
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the hazardous waste
concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous waste; and
(vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, State, or local officials to
prevent any harm to the public health or environment.
Id. at 1256 '(discussing provisions of the Gore Amendment). Thus, the Gore Amendment was even
less stringent than the Restatement (Second) of Torts, allowing a court to apportion liability where
the harm is divisible even if the defendant could not prove his exact contribution. See infra notes 65-
74 and accompanying text for discussion of the Restatement's treatment ofjoint and several liability.
" See 126 CONG. RE. H31,976, H-31,980-81 (1980) (remarks by Representatives Mikulski,
Gore, and Brown).
, See H.R. RE,. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6136-37 ("The Committee intends that for liability to attach under this section, the plaintiff
must demonstrate a causal or contributory nexus between the acts of the defendant and the conditions
which necessitated response action .... ."); see also United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1339
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (discussing congressional intent).
, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988)).
H.R. REP. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 74 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856.
"Id. (quoting 126 CONG. Rac. H11,787).
"Id.
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mandatory imposition ofjoint and several liability under CERCLA cannot
be reconciled with the statutory intent of the Act.
B. Common Law Principles of Joint and Several Liability: The
Restatement Approach
The Restatement (Second) of Torts65 supports the contention that
joint and several liability should not apply to an indivisible potential
or averted harm. Section 875 of the Restatement provides: "Each of
two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a
single and indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability
to the injured party for the entire harm.""
The Restatement defines "harm" as "the existence of loss or
detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause."'67
The language "in fact" indicates that it is the actual harm rather than
the potential harm that must be indivisible before joint and several
liability is proper under section 875. A potential harm is a threat of
harm, not a harm that has in fact been caused.
The only "loss or detriment in fact" that can be said to flow from
a potential harm is the associated cost incurred by the EPA in
removing that specific threat of future harm to the environment.
Reading section 433A of the Restatement in conjunction with section
881 illustrates that damages should be apportioned among the
defendants causing an actual harm to the environment and those
merely contributing to the potential for additional environmental
damage at the site. Section 433A provides:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more
causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution
of each cause to a single harm.
,REATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 433B (apportionment of harm to causes), 875
(contributing tortfeasors), 881 (distinct or divisible harm) (1965).
"Id. § 875. An example of an indivisible harm would be:
Company A and Company B both negligently discharge oil into a stream. The oil,
floating on the surface of the stream, is ignited by a spark. A large fire results and bums
down C's bam. C may recover a judgment for the full amount of his damages (costs of
replacing the barn) from Company A, or Company B, or both of them.
Id. § 433A cnft. i, illus. 14.
"Id. § 7.
1992-93]
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(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two
or more causes.'
Under section 881, if two or more parties, "acting independently,
tortiously cause distinct harms or a single harm for which there is a
reasonable basis for division according to the contribution of each, each
is subject to liability only for the portion of the total harm that he has
himself caused."'69 Consequently, in an action by the EPA to recover
hazardous waste site cleanup costs, each defendant should pay only for
the costs that it has specifically caused the EPA to incur.7" If the
damages to the EPA include expenses incurred in both the removal of a
threat and the cleanup of an actual release, the damages should be
apportioned accordingly.
For example, any response action initiated by the EPA will be
prompted by the actual environmental contamination from a leaking
source, the presence of a risk that such a release will occur in the future,
or both. According to the Restatement argument, in any case, the "loss
or detriment in fact"'" includes the actual release of waste into the
environment and/or any cost incurred by the EPA in responding to the
hazards presented at the site. The apportionment sections are directed
toward actual harm because that is when the ability to apportion is most
at issue. When an actual release has occurred, the harm may be more
difficult to apportion because the chemicals may mix, making it
impossible to distinguish the damages. That is, it becomes impossible to
determine the specific environmental contamination and harm caused by
" Id. § 433A.
Id. § 881. An example of a divisible harm would be:
Through the negligence of A, B, and C, water escapes from irrigation ditches on their
land, and floods a part of D's farm. There is evidence that 50 percent of the water came
from A's ditch, 30 percent from B's and 20 percent from C's. On the basis of this
evidence, A may be held liable for 50 percent of the damages to [D]'sfarm, B liable for
30 percent, and C liable for 20 percent.
Id. § 433A cmt. d, illus. 4.
' It is interesting to note that the drafters of the Restatement actually treat the joint pollution
of the environment as subject to the divisibility rule. The drafters write:
There are other kinds of harm which while not so clearly marked out as severable into
distinct parts, are still capable of division upon a reasonable and rational basis, and of fair
apportionment among the causes responsible .... Such apportionment is commonly made
in cases of private nuisance, where the pollution of a stream ... has interfered with the
plaintiff's use or enjoyment of his land.
Id. § 433A cmt. d. This provision indicates that the Restatement envisions harm at a waste site as
divisible, and thus considers liability in such cases apportionable among the various defendants.
" See supra text accompanying note 67 (quoting RESrAThmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 7
(1965)).
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each defendant, and the extent to which his particular waste contribut-
ed to the incurrence of cleanup costs. In such a case, the actual harm
to the environment and costs incurred by the EPA are truly indivisi-
ble. However, when a potential threat associated with a particular site
is removed, it is quite simple to apportion the damages according to
the cost of removing each threatening barrel or container.
Where the harm in fact includes costs incurred by the EPA to
prevent a potential harm, in addition to the cleanup cost of the actual
spill, the costs should be apportioned. In the event of an actual
release, the EPA will incur costs in cleaning up the spilled waste. If
the EPA is responding to a mere threat or risk of release, its expenses
will be those incurred in the removal of the threat. A threatened
release is notably distinct from an actual release, both in terms of
associated cleanup costs and in terms of damage to the environment.
The cost of removing a nonleaking, potentially threatening barrel is
significantly less than containing a spilled substance and ridding the
environment of its harmful effects. Furthermore, where a defendant
has created only a threatened harm, his contribution to the actual
harm is identifiably separate from those polluters whose waste has
actually leaked into the environment. There is no opportunity for that
defendant's waste to commingle with or to interact synergistically
with the spilled waste.72 Simply put, the defendant's waste has caused
no actual environmental damage at all. While the defendant whose waste
has leaked causes actual harm in the form of apparent environmental
contamination and the associated cleanup costs, the defendant whose
waste merely poses a threat of future spills contributes to the actual harm
only by way of increasing the EPA's response costs. The actual harm is
therefore readily divisible among the various defendants. Under section
433A of the Restatement, if the defendant can illustrate a reasonable basis
for calculating his particular contribution to the response cost, he should
be liable only for that portion.
If the argument set forth by the EPA in O'Neil were accepted, the
policy endorsed by the Restatement that a party pays only for the harm
he has caused would be thwarted. For example, suppose that the waste of
a particular defendant has been found at a site at which the EPA has
responded to an actual release. Further, suppose that the same defendant's
waste has in no way contributed to the actual release of hazardous
substances into the environment, but is simply present at the site in sealed
' Courts often cite the commingling and synergistic effects of wastes in ruling that the harm at
a particular site is indivisible. See infia note 111 and accompanying text.
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and intact barrels. Clearly, the mere presence is sufficient to create
liability under the Act,73 but should that defendant be jointly and
severally liable for the entire cost associated with cleaning up the site?
Under the Restatement, the actual harm that has occurred at this site is
divisible, and there is a rational basis to apportion liability. The defen-
dant's contribution to the actual harm at the site is limited to the costs
associated with removing the risk of further release; the defendant has not
contributed to the actual release of hazardous substances into the
environment. Therefore, under the Restatement, the defendant should be
liable only for the response cost of removing that particular
risk-assuming of course that the defendant can illustrate a rational basis
to calculate such cost.74 The defendant should not be liable in any way
for the cost associated with the cleanup of the spilled waste. However, an
acceptance of the EPA's argument would allow the Agency to hold the
defendant jointly and severally liable by asserting that the harm avoided
by the EPA'sresponse action would have been indivisible had it occurred,
or that the potential harm at the site was indivisible. Clearly, this would
expose the defendant to liability for cost to which he did not contribute,
and would be contrary to the Restatement's provision for apportioning
liability when a rational basis exists to do so. In order to comply with the
Restatement approach, the inquiry for the purpose of determining
divisibility must be limited to the actual harm that has occurred and not
what might have been. In the case of an EPA claim, "actual harm" should
be defined as including any actual release of chemicals into the environ-
ment and any costs incurred by the EPA in cleaning up the site, but
should not be so broad as to include the creation of a mere risk of
environmental damage.
I. CASE LAW UNDER CERCLA
Further support for the O'Neil court's decision to reject the EPA's
argument can be found within the existing case law under CERCLA.
"The courts have examined CERCLA's legislative history and concluded
that by deleting the joint and several language, Congress intended the
courts to apply flexible common law principles of liability allocation to
CERCLA rather than a rigid, legislative mandate that joint and several
liability apply in every case."'75 Furthermore, "courts have consistently
"See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
"For example, the defendant might show that there is a rational basis for computing the cost
of removal per barrel.
Gulino, supra note 49, at 674.
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concluded that joint and several liability is permissible but not mandatory
under [section 107 of CERCLA], and that liability [is to] be apportioned
on a case-by-case basis."76 Thus, any attempt by the EPA to establish
mandatory joint and several liability is improper.
In addition, the courts have indicated that the appropriate inquiry for
determining divisibility of harm and reasonableness of apportionment
should focus on the actual harm that has occurred-the actual environmen-
tal pollution and/or the costs incurred by the EPA in cleaning up the
site-rather than the potential or averted harm. Courts deciding the issue
of divisibility for a particular site have repeatedly focused on the costs
incurred by the EPA or the actual environmental conditions present at the
site when deciding how to apportion liability.' Noticeably absent from
the case law is any decision allowing joint and several liability on the
basis of an indivisible potential or averted harm.
A. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.
The seminal case discussing joint and several liability under CERCLA is
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp." In this decision, the federal district
court critically analyzed the legislative history of CERCLA79 and concluded
that the scope of liability is to be "determined under common law principles,
where a court performing a case-by-case evaluation of the complex factual
scenarios associated with multiple generator waste sites will assess the
propriety of applying joint and several liability on an individual basis. '80 In
rendering its decision, the court endorsed the Restatement approach' to
deciding whether joint and several liability is proper under CERCLA.82 The
court stated:
This case, as do most pollution cases, turns on the issue of whether
the harm caused at Chem-Dyne is "divisible" or "indivisible." If the
harm is divisible and if there is a reasonable basis for apportionment
of damages, each defendant is liable only for the portion of the
harm he himself caused.... On the other hand, if the defendants
2 SuSAN M. Coon, THE LAw oF HAZARDous WAsTn § 14.01[6][C][i] (1990).
See infra notes 78-111 and accompanying text.
"572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
See supra notes 42-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of legislative history.
Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 806-10.
"Id. at 810. See also supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text (discussing joint and several
liability principles under the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
' Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810-11.
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caused an indivisible harm, each is subject to liability for the entire
harT. 3
The court concluded that these general principles of tort law clearly
provide the appropriate analysis to be undertaken when applying
CERCLA and are most likely to advance the legislative policies and
objectives of the Act.' 4 The court favored the Restatement approach
because it allows defendants to avoid an unjust imposition of joint and
several liability by showing that the harm that has occurred is divisible.
Where a defendant has contributed to the creation of only a threatened
release at a site, that party should be able to avoid joint and several
liability by demonstrating the cost incurred by the EPA in removing that
specific threat. Under Chem-Dyne, joint and several liability is not
mandatory, but rather hinges upon the divisibility of harm.s" In order to
avoid the wholesale imposition of joint and several liability urged by the
EPA, the harm evaluated in determining divisibility should be limited to
the actual harm. To rule otherwise would be tantamount to imposing
strict, joint and several liability in every case, a result clearly rejected by
the Chem-Dyne court.
In light of the legislative history of CERCLA, the Chem-Dyne
decision sets forth the appropriate approach to imposing joint and several
liability-one that rests upon the specific conditions of each and every
waste site rather than a broad, sweeping approach. As a result, a number
of courts have followed the Chem-Dyne court's lead and now apply the
Restatement approach in imposing joint and several liability in CERCLA
cases.
86
B. United States v. Monsanto Co.
The rationale behind Chem-Dyne was echoed in the Fourth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Monsanto Co." In Monsanto, a number of
government and private entities contracted with South Carolina Recycling
Id. at 811 (citing RESATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 881, 875 (1965)).
"Id. at 810.
"Id. ("[A] blanket adoption of the joint and several liability standard ... would be inconsistent
with the legislative history of CERCLA.").
" Se4 e-g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1106 (1989); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 n.13 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1312-13 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. Dickerson, 640
F. Supp. 448, 450 (D. Md. 1986); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1489-90 (D. Colo.
1985).
858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
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and Disposal, Inc. ("ScRDr') to transport and dispose of chemical and
other waste." Over a four-year period SCRDI placed more than 7000
drums of various chemical wastes on a four-acre site. 9 The careless
handling of these wastes resulted in fires, fumes, and explosions that
eventually prompted a massive EPA response action." The EPA
identified waste bearing the labels of three generator defendants.9 The
district court found the defendants jointly and severally liable for the
cleanup costs.'
The generator defendants challenged this ruling on appeal, claiming
that each of them had supplied a potentially identifiable volume of waste
to SCRDI and that liability should be apportioned according to volume.93
The court of appeals initially recognized that CERCLA allows, but does
not require, joint and several liability.' Recognizing its duty to consider
traditional and evolving principles of common law in determining
whether joint and several liability is appropriate,95 the court considered
Section 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.96 Although the
Monsanto court refused to apportion the liability based on volume,97 the
ruling can be viewed as an endorsement of flexible rather than mandatory
imposition of joint and several liability.9" The court viewed the fact that
the waste at the site had commingled as a reason to rule out the
possibility of divisible harm,' but stated that under other circumstances
proportionate volumes of hazardous substances may very well be
probative of contributory haim. °e The Monsanto court was concerned
that where the waste of different defendants mixes and forms a toxic
soup, volume alone is not a rational basis of apportioning harm; other
factors may impact on the divisibility.0 ' The court, however, did not
hId.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 164-65.
, Id. at 164.
'* Id. at 166.
"Id.
' Id. at 171.
"Id.
"Id. at 172; see also supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 433A
of the Restatement.
"Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172-73.
nId. at 172 ("[The defendants] presented no evidence, however, showing a relationship between
waste volume, the release of hazardous substances, and the harm at the site."); see also id. at n.25.
"Id. at 172.
10 Id.
.Id. at n.26 ("We agree with the district court that evidence disclosing the relative toxicity,
migratory potential, and synergistic capacity of the hazardous substances at the site would be relevant
to establishing divisibility of harm.").
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reject apportioning harm on the basis of volume when it can be "reason-
ably assumed, or has been demonstrated, that independent factors had no
substantial effect on the harm to the environment."'"2 The Monsanto
court thus clearly rejected the mandatory imposition of joint and several
liability in favor of a more flexible approach.
C. Additional Support
Courts generally favor the Restatement approach relied on by the
Chem-Dyne and Monsanto courts because it facilitates fairness, one of the
main concerns of Congress in adopting the legislation without specific
reference to joint and several liability." For example, the court in
United States v. Wade"0 5 stated that the Restatement approach helps to
"ameliorate the harshness of the liability provisions of the statute."'0 6
Acceptance of this approach ensures that defendants pay only for the
harm they have caused. Thus, a defendant who has contributed only to
the risk of harm at the site, or one who has proven that the actual harm
is divisible and capable of apportionment, is not responsible for the entire
cleanup cost associated with an actual release of hazardous waste into the
'environment. This approach will encourage companies dealing with
hazardous waste to take the necessary precautions to prevent leakage of
their particular waste so as to avoid facing joint and several liability in
the event that other companies' waste actually leaks. Those who are made
parties to a suit by the EPA because their waste was present at a site
from which there was a release or threatened release will be able to limit
their liability by showing that their waste did not actually leak and that
a reasonable basis exists for calculating their contribution to the EPA's
response cost.
The quest for fairness under CERCLA was taken a step further by the
court in United States v. A & F Materials Co."7 The court in A & F
o Id. at n.27.
,0' See Weber, supra note 3, at 1478 ('ITe majority of courts follow United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp. in adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts approach.") (citations omitted).
"o See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
:' 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
t Id. at 1339.
107 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984). The court felt that even the Restatement approach was too
strict an approach for imposing joint and several liability. In endorsing an approach that would allow
a court to consider equitable factors in apportioning liability, the court stated:
After reviewing the legislative history, the Court concludes a rigid application of the
Restatement approach to joint and several liability is inappropriate. Under the Restatement
approach, any defendant who could not prove its contribution would be jointly and
severally liable. This .result must be avoided because both Houses of Congress were
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Materials endorsed the principle set forth in the Gore Amendment,' 8
stating that the "moderate approach promotes fairness because it does not
indiscriminately impose joint and several liability."'0 9 Although the
ultimate result under the moderate and Restatement approaches may vary,
the underlying concern of both is fairness. Thus, regardless of which
theory a court chooses to accept, both indicate that the theory asserted by
the EPA in O'Neil must be rejected. The mandatory imposition of joint
and several liability that would result from the EPA theory cannot be
reconciled with the legislative and judicial treatment the issue has
received.
In order to institute a flexible and fair approach to apportioning
liability such that the defendants in a CERCLA action are held responsi-
ble only for the harm they have caused, the inquiry must delve into the
actual environmental contamination present at the site or the costs
incurred by the EPA in rectifying actual or potential harm to the
environment. To allow an indivisible potential harm to establish joint and
several liability would result in the mandatory imposition of joint and
several liability, potentially exposing a party to liability for environmental
damage not attributable to that party's conduct. A party could be held
jointly and severally liable for the entire cleanup cost simply because her
waste was present at a site where the potential harm was or would have
been indivisible had it occurred. Such a result would directly conflict
with the fairness consideration embraced by the federal courts, which
have concluded that a defendant should be liable only for the harm she
has caused." ' A defendant who has contributed only to the risk of
potential harm should be liable only for the cost of removing that risk of
harm, not the entire cleanup cost associated with the site. Likewise, a
defendant whose waste has leaked, but not contributed to an indivisible
toxic soup, should be liable only for the cost of cleaning up her specific
waste. Accordingly, in deciding the issue of divisibility of harm, courts
concerned about the issue of fairness, and joint and several liability is extremely harsh and
unfair if it is imposed on a defendant who contributed only a small amount of waste to
a site.
Id. at 1256.
'" Id. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text for a description of the Gore Amendment.
10 A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1257. At least one other court has accepted the moderate
approach endorsed by A & F Materials in deciding a suit between two private parties. See Allied
Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1988); cf. United States
v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that the court has discretion to
use equitable factors in apportioning damages in contribution actions in order to mitigate the
hardships of imposing joint and several liability upon defendants who have contributed only a small
amount to a potentially large indivisible harm).
, See supra notes 83, 103-09 and accompanying text.
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have repeatedly focused on the actual environmental harm that has
occurred (the present condition of the site-rather than the potential
condition) or the costs incurred by the EPA during cleanup."'
D. Illustrative Example: United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.
The proposition that the divisibility inquiry should be limited to the
actual harm associated with the site is supported by the Third Circuit's
recent decision in United States v. Akan Aluminum Corp."' In Akan,
the court vacated a district court decision granting summary judgment
against Alcan and imposing joint and several liability because Alcan's
... See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988) ("The generator
defendants bore the burden of establishing a reasonable basis for apportioning liability among
responsible parties. To meet this burden, the generator defendants had to establish that the
environmental harm at Bluff Road was divisible among responsible parties.') (emphasis added); see
also id. at n.22 (holding that the question of joint and several liability "focuses principally on the
divisibility among responsible parties of the harm to the environment."). In United States v. Ottati
& Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1396 (D.N.H. 1985), the court held.
[A] reasonable basis exists for determining the contribution of each liable generator to the
" harm relating to surface cleanup at the Ottati & Goss site. The basis is the number of
drums sent to the site by each generator .... Each of the generators ... is liable for the
[specific volumetric] percentages of the Ottati & Goss surface clean-up costs incurred by
the government ....
Id. See also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1206 (2d Cir. 1992) ("mhe amount of
liability imposed [on a generator] ... will be a function of the extent to which ... dumping of
hazardous substances both engendered the necessity, and contributed to the costs, of cleanup."); City
of New York v. Exxon Corp., 766 F. Supp. 177, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (The defendant, in order to
avoid joint and several liability, must "establish that the environmental harm at the City landfills was
divisible among responsible parties.'). The Exxon court's focusing on the actual harm is further
supported by the statement that
the wholesale commingling of different generators' wastes ... precludes a finding that the
harm in this case is divisible. ... [Defendant's] waste was mixed with the wastes of other
generators. ... [lit is scientifically impossible to determine the precise origin of any of
the hazardous substances that have been detected at the City landfills.
Id. Cf. United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 843 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (recognizing that a
defendant's relative contribution to a waste site may have an impact on the issue ofjoint and several
liability, thus focusing on the actual condition of or harm present at the site); United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (1983) (focusing on the actual condition of the site or the actual
spill that had occurred in concluding that the harm was indivisible). The Chem-Dyne court stated-
Some of the wastes have commingled but the identities of the sources of these wastes
remain unascertained. The fact of the mixing of the wastes raises an issue as to the
divisibility of the harm. Further, a dispute exists over which of the wastes have
contaminated the ground water, the degree of their migration and concomitant health
hazard.
I'd. at 811. In United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987), the court held that
the harm was indivisible "due to the synergistic effects and the commingling of different wastes."
Id. at 1060. Thus, the Stringfellow court focused on the divisibility, or lack thereof, of the actual
harm or damage done to the environment rather than the potential harm that may have occurred. Id.
.. 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992).
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hazardous substance was present at a site from which there was a
release."' The court relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts in
holding that if the harm at the site is capable of apportionment,
liability should not be joint and several." 4 The court explained that
"of critical importance in this analysis is whether a harm is divisible
and reasonably capable of apportionment, or indivisible, thereby
subjecting the tortfeasor to potentially far-reaching liability." 5 In
remanding the case on the issue of divisibility, the court directed that
Alcan be given an opportunity to establish a reasonable basis for
limiting its liability based on its actual contribution to the harm at the
site. " "
Clearly, the presence of Alcan's substances at the site posed a
threat of harm to the environment, and the EPA arguably prevented
a harm that could have been indivisible, absent EPA intervention.
However, the Third Circuit refused to impose joint and several
liability on that basis alone. Instead, it remanded, stating:
[W]e find that the court should have conducted a hearing to determine
the divisibility of harm to the Susquehanna River, and will remand the
case for the court to do so. If Alcan can establish in that hearing that
the harm is capable of reasonable apportionment, then it should be held
liable only for the response costs relating to that portion of harm to
which it contributed. 17
The court thus focused its inquiry on the actual environmental harm
present at the site and the cost incurred by the EPA in rectifying that
harm,"' rather than focusing on the potential or averted harm
associated with the site. By focusing on the divisibility of costs
incurred by the EPA, a party that has created only a threatened or
potential harm would be liable for only the cleanup costs specifically
. Id. at 271. "Accordingly, [the district court] held that Alcan was jointly and severally liable
for the removal costs because Alkan's waste contained identifiable levels of hazardous substances
and was present at the Site from which there was a release." Id. at 257. See also United States v.
Northemaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987), affdsub nom. United States v. R.W.
Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 1057 (1990). The Northernaire
court found joint and several liability appropriate because the source of the harm--the presence of
the hazardous substances at the Northemaire facility"-was indivisible. Id. at 748.
. Akcan, 964 F.2d at 269.
"' Id. at 269.
I d. at 271.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 269 ("[Alcan] should only be liable for that portion of the harm fairly attributable to
it.").
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allocable to removing the threat of harm posed by that party's waste,
assuming a reasonable basis for calculating that cost exists."9
Had the EPA's prevention of a potentially indivisible harm been
sufficient to establish joint and several liability for all generators present
at the site, there would have been no need to remand the issue of
divisibility to the lower court, and Alcan would have faced potentially
extensive liability irrespective of its contribution either to the actual harm
at the site or to the cost incurred by the EPA. The Alcan scenario
illustrates the potential for gross unfairness that would result if courts
adopted the EPA's theory and imposed joint and several liability on the
basis of an indivisible potential or averted harm. The need to limit the
inquiry for purposes of determining divisibility to the actual harm that has
occurred is clear. An acceptance of the EPA's argument would enable it
to refute any defendant's argument that a rational basis for apportioning
liability exists, regardless of its validity, by simply stating quite specula-
tively that, had the Agency not intervened, an indivisible harm would
have occurred. In order to avoid this result and to satisfy the congression-
al intent of fairness,'2 ° the inquiry for purposes of determining divisibili-
ty is appropriately limited to the actual harm that has
occurred"'-whether that actual harm is a release of harmful chemicals
into the environment or the costs associated with removing the risk of a
potential release.
IV. ALLOCATION OF PRE-CLEANUP AND FIXED COSTS
The discussion has thus far focused primarily on the allocation of
variable costs associated with the actual cleanup phase of an EPA
response action-the costs of removing the hazardous substances from the
site. However, significant costs can be incurred by the EPA before the
agency actually begins to remove the waste. Some costs are simply
nonvariable costs associated with every cleanup project. Among these
costs are the preparation of the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility
Study (RI/FS),' the purpose of which is to assess site conditions and
evaluate alternatives to the extent necessary to select a remedy,123 and
" Alcan might have been able to show a reasonable method of calculating the cost of removal
per barrel, establish the number of its barrels left at the site, and thus establish the extent to which
it had contributed to the response costs incurred by the EPA.
" See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
12, See supra note II1 and accompanying text.
" The Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study is required by 40 C.F.Rt 300.430(a)(2)
(1992).
13 Id.
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certain administrative and transaction costs. Because these pre-cleanup
and fixed costs can constitute a significant portion of the total cost
incurred by the EPA in responding to a site, 4 it is important to discuss
how rejection of the EPA's theory may affect the allocation of such costs
among multiple defendants."z
An acceptance of the EPA's theory would render all defendants
jointly and severally liable for these pre-cleanup and fixed costs in every
case, just as it would impose mandatory joint and several liability among
defendants for the costs of physically removing the waste from the site.
A defendant who contributed to an indivisible potential or threatened
harm at a site would be liable for the entire amount of administrative
costs and for investigating and assessing the conditions of the site prior
to cleanup, regardless of that defendant's contribution to the actual harm
at the site. A defendant that has illustrated that the actual harm at the site
is divisible and has shown a rational basis for calculating its contribution
to that harm should be liable only for that portion of harm that defendant
has in fact caused.
To illustrate the ramifications of the EPA's theory with respect to
these pre-cleanup costs, assume that a defendant has contributed only to
the threat of release at a site and not the actual release. Under the EPA's
theory, the defendant could be jointly and severally liable for all of the
pre-cleanup and administrative costs because it has contributed to an
indivisible potential harm. However, as discussed above, the harm caused
by an actual release versus that caused by the defendant's threatened
release is notably different. Similarly, the task of determining the
appropriate method of response for an actual spill is more complex and
1ZU See E. Donald Elliot, Superfund: EPA Success, National Debate?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T,
Winter 1992, at 11, 12 ("The single most damning statistic about the Superfund program is that it
takes, on average, ten years to clean up each site, but only about three years is actual on-site
construction work)r); id. at 13 (observing that "it takes seven years and at least $4 million in
transaction costs at each site to conduct the necessary studies and design remedies before the final
cleanup can begin").
" The language of CERCLA has been interpreted as providing the government with broad cost
recovery rights. One court noted that among the activities for which the government can recover
response costs are the following:
(a) Investigations, monitoring and testing to identify the extent of danger to the public
health or welfare or the environment.
(b) Investigations, monitoring and testing to identify the extent of the release or threatened
release of hazardous substances.
(c) Planning and implementation of a response action.
(d) Recovery of the costs associated with the above actions, and to enforce the provisions
of CERCLA, including the costs incurred for the staffs of the EPA and the Department
of Justice.
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
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expensive than that required for a mere threatened release. When only a
threat of release has been created, the proper response is obvious-removal
of the barrel, transformer, etc. However, when an actual release has
occurred, various containment and removal strategies may be undertaken,
and investigation for the purpose of selecting the proper method of
response can become highly complex.'26 When an RI/FS is prepared for
a site at which there are both threatened and actual releases, the portion
of the total cost of such study attributable to addressing the threatened
release will be less than that allocable to assessing and investigating the
actual spill.'27 However, under the EPA's theory, all defendants at such
a site are jointly and severally liable for these costs. Thus, the defendant
creating only the threatened harm is liable to an extent in excess of his
actual contribution to the pre-cleanup costs. Similarly, a defendant whose
waste has leaked, but not contributed to an indivisible actual harm, could
be held jointly and severally liable for these costs on the basis of the
EPA's indivisible potential or averted harm theory.'
As with the actual costs of cleanup (removal), the notion embodied
in the Restatement that a defendant should pay only for the harm he has
caused"ss is not satisfied when a defendant is held jointly and severally
liable for these pre-cleanup and fixed costs on the basis of an indivisible
potential harm. The theory set forth by the EPA in O'Neil essentially
treats all defendants as if their waste had leaked and commingled,
irrespective of whether commingling actually occurred. This theory makes
all defendants equally liable without regard to actual culpability or
contribution to the waste at the site. For the same reasons set forth in
refuting the EPA's argument with respect to joint and several liability for
actual cleanup costs,"' those defendants who have contributed only to
an indivisible threatened or averted harm should not be jointly and
severally liable for these pre-cleanup and administrative costs.
Under the Restatement approach, when the harm is divisible and a
reasonable basis exists on which to apportion that harm, joint and several
liability is inappropriate.' Therefore, a defendant wishing to avoid such
liability must show a reasonable basis to apportion the harm. This
" Elliot, supra note 124, at 12.
127 Id.
" See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
'2 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 42-64 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history); supra notes 65-
74 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatement approach to joint and several liability); supra
notes 75-111 and accompanying text (discussing case law interpreting joint and several liability under
CERCLA and rejecting mandatory imposition of such).
... See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
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requirement presents more of a challenge with respect to pre-cleanup and
fixed costs than with respect to removal costs, and may allow the EPA
to enforce joint and several liability by claiming absence of a reasonable
basis of apportionment. The EPA may argue that these costs are
attributable to the site as a whole and thus not capable of apportionment
among the various defendants.
While accurate division of the pre-cleanup and fixed costs will in
most cases be practically impossible, the costs incurred by the EPA with
respect to these pre-cleanup and administrative undertakings are, in a
sense, divisible. For example, the defendant who has created only a
potential harm has contributed to a lesser extent to the pre-cleanup and
fixed costs than those defendants whose waste has actually spilled or
leaked into the environment. Similarly, a defendant who establishes that
his contribution to the actual harm is divisible from that of other
defendants present should not be potentially liable for the total pre-clea-
nup and administrative costs incurred. In light of congressional concerns
of fairness," the mandatory imposition of joint and several liability for
these often significant costs should be avoided. The EPA should not be
permitted to impose joint and several liability for these costs by simply
claiming that the costs are attributable to the site as a whole and
incapable of allocation among defendants. Where the actual harm at a site
is shown to be divisible, these costs should be apportioned.
One means of apportioning the pre-cleanup and administrative costs
would be to assess liability in proportion to the particular defendant's
contribution to the total removal costs. This would allow a defendant who
has created only a threatened harm or release, and who is directly
responsible for only a small percentage of the total actual removal costs
at the site, to be liable only for his proportionately small amount of EPA
administrative costs. Likewise, those defendants whose waste had leaked,
but not contributed to an indivisible actual harm, could limit their
liability for these costs by proving their contribution to the total amount
of removal costs. Because a defendant's contribution to the actual removal
costs is closely related to the actual environmental damage that his
conduct has caused, 33 those defendants causing the greatest amount of
.32 See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
... For example, a defendant that has created only a threatened harm has caused the EPA to incur
the removal costs associated with removing that specific threat-most likely the cost of removing the
non-leaking barrel, transformer, etc. However, a defendant whose waste has leaked and caused actual
environmental contamination has engendered more substantial removal costs-the EPA will be forced
to contain the spill, remove the waste, and rid the environment of its harmful effects (topsoil removal,
water purification, etc.). Thus, the defendant's contribution to the EPA's total removal costs will
directly reflect their contribution to the actual environmental damage.
1992-93]
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environmental harm would face greater liability for the EPA's pre-cleanup
and administrative costs. A defendant's liability would thus truly reflect
his contribution to the environmental endangerment. This approach would
satisfy the fairness concerns of Congress"M and most accurately reflect
the proposition set forth by the Restatement that a defendant should be
liable only for that portion of total harm that he has in fact caused.'35
To hold otherwise would subject defendants to liability far in excess of
their actual contribution to the pre-cleanup and administrative costs
incurred by the EPA, and possibly allow the most culpable of defendants
to escape their fair share of liability.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of CERCLA was prompted by the desire of Congress
to clean up the nation's growing number of hazardous waste sites and
thereby eliminate a serious threat to the health and welfare of the
American public. While Congress intended to force those responsible for
creating the problems associated with hazardous waste sites to bear the
costs and responsibilities for remedying the condition, 3' it was not
willing to abandon all concerns of fairness with respect to the scope of
liability. The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress rejected
mandatory imposition of joint and several liability in the interest of
fairness to the potentially numerous defendants.'37 While one of the
primary concerns that motivated the enactment of CERCLA was to ensure
the recovery of cleanup costs incurred by the EPA from responsible
defendants, Congress did not envision imposing strict, joint and several
liability on all defendants present at a site. Accordingly, Congress
endorsed a flexible approach to liability, recommending that traditional
and evolving principles of common law be relied upon for determining
whether joint and several liability is proper in any given case."
The courts have followed this recommendation, allowing issues of
joint and several liability to be determined on a case-by-case basis in light
of accepted common law principles.'39 The courts have repeatedly cited
" See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
"' See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6120 ("The legislation would also establish a federal cause of action ... to enable the
Administration to pursue rapid recovery for the costs incurred ... from persons liable therefor
... See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
.. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
.. See supra notes 75-111 and accompanying text.
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the Restatement (Second) of Torts in holding that the appropriateness of
imposing joint and several liability under CERCLA depends on the
divisibility of harm at the site.' They have further adhered to the logic
set forth in the Restatement by imposing joint and several liability among
defendants only when the actual harm at the site is indivisible.'41
To allow the EPA to impose joint and several liability on the basis
of an indivisible potential harm would essentially result in automatic joint
and several liability, clearly frustrating the intent of Congress and running
afoul of the substantial body of case law under CERCLA. Additionally,
acceptance of the EPA's argument would directly conflict with the
principle endorsed by the Restatement that a defendant pay only for the
harm that he has in fact caused. 42 Therefore, the criticism directed at
the EPA's argument by the O'Neil court was warranted.'43 Had Congress
intended liability under CERCLA to be joint and several in every case,
it could have included language to that effect in the Act or the Act's
amendments. Congress might one day find it necessary to impose such
liability, but until that day, any attempt by the EPA to expand the
divisibility inquiry to include potential or averted harm or to impose joint
and several liability on the basis of an indivisible potential or averted
harm should be rejected.
B. Todd Wetzel
t, See supra notes 75-111 and accompanying text.
t" See supra note I1I and accompanying text.
," See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 19-41 and accompanying text.
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